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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals properly has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 78-2a-3(k) (Supp. 1995), in 
that this case was poured over to the Court of Appeals from the 
Utah Supreme Court. (R. 000 250.) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The Jensens disagree with the statement of the issues on 
appeal contained in the brief submitted by the Plaintiff/Appellant 
The Salt Lake Investment Company (hereinafter "SLIC"). Indeed, 
rather than presenting the real issues, SLIC has merely articulated 
a number of sub-issues. The Jensens believe that the real issues 
to be resolved on appeal, and the applicable standards of review, 
are as follows: 
ISSUE NO. l; Did the trial court err in deciding that 
there were no genuine issues of material fact, and that, as a 
matter of law, SLIC lacked standing to sue or be sued, and in 
therefore granting summary judgment in favor of the appellees? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Court of Appeals must determine 
whether the Jensens were entitled to summary judgment, and that 
determination is a question of law which is reviewed for correct-
ness. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Kearl. 896 P.2d 644, 646 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995) ; State Bank of Southern Utah v. Troy Hyaro Systems. 
Inc., 894 P.2d 1270, 1274 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). In reviewing for 
correctness, the court must apply the same mode of analysis 
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required of the lower court. See Lucky Seven Radio Corp. v. Clark. 
755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) . The proper mode of analysis 
for determining whether the Jensens are entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law is to determine whether a genuine issue of material 
fact exists, and, if not, whether the Jensens' position is correct 
as a matter of law. See Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 
235 (Utah 1993); Wvcalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821, 824 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989), cert, denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1990); Fashion 
Place Inv. Ltd. v. Salt Lake County. 776 P.2d 941, 943 (Utah Ct. 
App.), cert, denied, 783 P.2d 53 (Utah 1989). In addition, the 
court must consider the facts and all inferences from the facts in 
a light most favorable to SLIC, the non-movant. See United Park v. 
Greater Park, 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993); Lucky Seven Radio 
Corp.. 755 P.2d at 752. However, the Court of Appeals may affirm 
the trial court's grant of summary judgment on any ground available 
to the lower court, regardless of whether or not that ground was 
relied upon by the lower court. See Higgins. 855 P.2d at 235. 
SLIC erroneously argues that a genuine issue of material 
fact exists because the lower court determined that 30 years was 
far beyond a reasonable time to wind up the activities of a 
dissolved corporation. (See Appellant's Brief, at 9, 20.) SLIC 
suggests that the lower court's application of such a "reason-
ableness" standard raises an issue of material fact. (See id.) 
The lower court's application of such a "reasonableness" standard, 
244903 1 - 9 " 
however, is a question of law, not fact. Statutory analysis to 
determine whether a statute implies a "reasonable" time period is 
a question of law which is reviewable under the "correctness" 
standard. See, e.g., Salt Lake County Cottonwood Sanitary Dist. v. 
Sandy Citv. 879 P.2d 1379, 1381 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied. 890 
P.2d 1034 (Utah 1994) (statutory analysis is an issue of law). 
Additionally, according to Pacific Dev. Co. v. Stewart. 
195 P. 2d 748 (Utah 1948), "where the facts surrounding the 
transaction are undisputed . . . this court may determine, as a 
matter of law, what is a reasonable time." Id. at 751 (emphasis 
added) (regarding reasonable notice of real estate forfeiture). 
See also Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur.. 854 P.2d 527, 532 (Utah 
1993) (whether 90-day delay in mitigating damages was reasonable is 
a question of law where relevant facts are uncontroverted). In the 
present case, it is undisputed that SLIC filed a Notice of Intent 
to Dissolve and Articles of Dissolution with the Utah Department of 
Commerce 30 years ago. The only remaining question is whether the 
30-year delay to bring a quiet title action is reasonable, which is 
a question of law for the lower court, and which should be reviewed 
by this Court under the correctness standard. 
ISSUE NO. 2: Did the trial court err in denying SLIC's 
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Following the entry of summary 
judgment by the trial court, SLIC brought a motion to alter or 
244903 1 " 1 0 -
amend judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civi l 
Procedure, Such a motion under Rule 59(e) i s t echn ica l ly a motion 
for a new t r i a l , even though no t r i a l was ever conducted. See 
I n t e r s t a t e Land Corp. v . Pat terson, 797 P.2d 1101, 1105 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990); Moon Lake E l e c t r i c a l Ass'n v. Ultrasysterns Western 
Constructors . I n c . , 767 P.2d 125, 127 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The 
lower c o u r t ' s denial of SLIC's motion to a l t e r or amend judgment 
must be reviewed under an abuse-of -d iscre t ion s tandard. See 
Crooks ton v. Fire Ins . Exch. , 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993); 
Christenson v. Jewkes. 761 P.2d 1375, 1377 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
(" [B]oth the grant ing of, and the refusing to grant , a new t r i a l i s 
a matter l e f t to the d i s c r e t i on of the t r i a l judge, and tha t 
decis ion wi l l be reversed only i f the judge has abused tha t 
d i s c r e t i on by ac t ing unreasonably ." ) . 1 
1
 SLIC a l s o r a i s e s two other i s s u e s that are r e a l l y non- i s sues . F i r s t , 
i t argues that , under Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judic ia l Administration, i t 
should have been granted oral argument on the Jensens' Motion t o Dismiss, or 
A l t ernat ive ly , for Summary Judgment. (See Appel lant ' s Brief , at 29.) The lower 
court denied SLIC's request for oral argument on the b a s i s that SLIC's oppos i t ion 
to the motion was f r i v o l o u s . (See Ruling on Defendants' Motion t o Dismiss , or 
A l t ernat ive ly , for Summary Judgment (R. 000 162), at 4.) SLIC i n c o r r e c t l y 
argues, however, that t h i s i s sue should be reviewed under a correctness standard. 
(See Appel lant ' s Brief , at 3.) On the contrary, ru l ings by a d i s t r i c t court on 
procedural matters should be reviewed under an abuse -o f -d i scre t ion standard. 
See, e . g . , Crossland Sav. v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1994) (lower 
court ' s denial of motion t o extend time to reply t o summary judgment motion i s 
reviewed under abuse of d i s c r e t i o n standard); Prows v. Pinpoint Reta i l S v s . , 
I n c . , 868 P.2d 809, 810 (Utah 1993) (lower court dec i s ion that venue i s proper 
i s reviewed under abuse of d i s c r e t i o n standard); Ludlow v. Sa l t Lake County Bd. 
of Adi ustment, 893 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (lower cour t ' s 
determination of whether a party i s necessary and indispensable i s reviewed under 
abuse of d i s c r e t i o n standard); Trembly v . Mrs. F ie lds Cookies. 884 P.2d 1306, 
1312 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (lower court ' s grant of motion t o r e v i s e order i s 
reviewed under abuse of d i s c r e t i o n standard). Because the lower c o u r t ' s denial 
of SLIC's request for oral argument was of a procedural nature, t h i s Court should 
therefore review that rul ing under the abuse -o f -d i scre t ion standard. More 
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STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION I S OF CENTRAL 
IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL2 
1 . Utah Code Ann. § 1 6 - 1 0 - 1 0 1 (1973 R e p l . V o l . ) . 
2 . Utah Code Ann. § 16 -10 -100 (1973 R e p l . V o l . ) . 
3 . Utah Code Ann. § 1 6 - 1 0 - 8 7 (1973 R e p l . V o l . ) . 
4 . Utah Code Ann. § 1 6 - 1 0 - 8 8 (1973 R e p l . V o l . ) . 
5 . Utah Code Ann. § 1 6 - 1 0 a - 1 4 0 5 (1995 R e p l . V o l . ) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
SLIC i s a c o r p o r a t i o n t h a t was v o l u n t a r i l y d i s s o l v e d i n 
1965 , and which h a s t h e r e f o r e b e e n l e g a l l y d e a d f o r o v e r 30 y e a r s . 
SLIC commenced i t s a c t i o n , s e e k i n g t o q u i e t t i t l e t o c e r t a i n 
p a t e n t e d m i n i n g c l a i m s . One s u c h c l a i m , t h e Amis No. 1 p a t e n t e d 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y , SLIC has f a i l e d to explain how the denial of oral argument in any-
way a f fec ted the outcome of the lower court ' s dec i s ion , or to describe any 
argument or information that SLIC was unable to put before the court in i t s 
memoranda. 
Second, SLIC argues that i t should have been permitted to amend so 
as to correct any def ic iency regarding the proper party p l a i n t i f f . (See 
Appel lant 's Brief, at 4, 25.) SLIC correc t ly notes that t h i s i s sue should be 
reviewed under an abuse-of -d i scret ion standard. (Id. at 4.) SLIC incorrec t ly 
a s s e r t s , however, that t h i s i s sue was properly preserved. (Id. ( c i t ing to a 
reference in SLIC's Memorandum of Points and Authori t ies in Opposition to Motion 
to Dismiss, or Al ternat ive ly , for Summary Judgment (R. 000 58) , at 10 (R. 000 
49)) .) On the contrary, no motion for leave to amend was ever f i l e d , br ie fed or 
ruled upon. I t i s fundamental that " [a]n appl icat ion to the court for an order 
sha l l be by motion [ . ]" Utah R. Civ. P. 7 ( a ) . Because SLIC never properly 
requested that the lower court grant leave to amend, t h i s i s sue was not properly 
preserved. 
2
 These s t a t u t e s are quoted in f u l l in the Addendum hereto . 
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placer mining claim, i s already the subject of another pending 
lawsuit in the Fourth D i s t r i c t Court, which involves, among other 
th ings , a dispute between the Jensens and appel lee Sharron Ki l l ion 
as to the ownership of Amis No. I . 3 In f i l i n g the underlying 
ac t ion tha t i s the subject of t h i s appeal, SLIC attempted to revive 
i t s e l f from i t s corporate death in order to a s s e r t a claim of 
ownership as to various mining claims, including the Amis No. 1 
claim. 
In addi t ion to the fact tha t SLIC has been l e g a l l y dead 
for almost 30 years , SLIC's sole remaining former shareholders , 
Lois P. Connell and Evelyn P. Boyce (who apparent ly brought the 
ac t ion in SLIC's name), conveyed by qui t -c la im deeds whatever 
i n t e r e s t s they may have had in the Amis No. 1 claim to the Jensens 
in November 1993. 
As discussed more fu l ly below, because SLIC l e g a l l y does 
not e x i s t , the t r i a l court was correc t in grant ing summary judgment 
based on the fact tha t SLIC lacks standing to sue or be sued. 
Addi t ional ly , the fact tha t SLIC's sole remaining former sharehold-
ers have conveyed whatever i n t e r e s t s they may have had in the Amis 
3
 The Jensens and K i l l i o n are involved in an ac t ion regarding the 
ownership of the Amis No. 1 claim pending in the Fourth D i s t r i c t Court s t y l e d 
Wilford H. Hansen Stone Quarries, Inc. v . Jensen, C i v i l No. 930400247. The only 
claim in P l a i n t i f f ' s Complaint in the ins tant ac t ion (R. 000 5) against the 
Jensens i s the f i r s t cause of ac t ion (which i s not numbered), which involves the 
Amis No. 1 claim. Neither of the other two causes of ac t ion in the Complaint i s 
asser ted against the Jensens. 
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No. 1 claim to the Jensens provides an additional basis for 
affirming the lower court's grant of summary judgment. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
SLIC filed its Complaint on October 21, 1994. (R. 000 
5.) On January 3, 1995, the Jensens filed a Motion to Dismiss, or 
Alternatively, for Summary Judgment. (R. 000 9.) The trial court 
treated the Jensens' motion as one for summary judgment, and on 
March 27, 1995, the court issued a Ruling on Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss, or Alternatively, for Summary Judgment, in which the court 
granted summary judgment, concluding that SLIC had been dissolved 
in 1965, and therefore lacked capacity to sue or be sued. (R. 000 
162.) The trial court subsequently entered an Order Granting 
Jensen Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on April 27, 1995. 
(R. 000 184.) 
Thereafter, on May 9, 1995, SLIC filed a "Motion to Alter 
and Amend Judgment (Order)". (R. 000 189.) On June 9, 1995, the 
trial court issued a Ruling on Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend 
Judgment, in which the court denied the motion. (R. 000 232.) On 
July 7, 1995, SLIC filed a Notice of Appeal. (R. 000 238.) On 
August 14, 1995, the Central Staff of the Utah Supreme Court sent 
a letter to SLIC's counsel, in which it raised a concern about 
whether the trial court's summary judgment was intended to dispose 
of all claims and all parties. (R. 000 245.) Thereafter, on 
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September 28, 1995, the trial court entered a Supplemental Order 
Confirming Dismissal of All Claims, (R. 000 254.) On October 4, 
1995, SLIC filed an Amended Notice of Appeal. (R. 000 256.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Salt Lake Investment Company was voluntarily 
dissolved on December 30, 1965, which is evidenced by: (1) SLIC's 
Statement of Intent to Dissolve, dated June 18, 1965 (R. 000 36); 
(2) SLIC's Articles of Dissolution, dated December 29, 1965 (R. 000 
40); and (3) Certification of Voluntary Dissolution, dated January 
5, 1995, issued by the Utah Division of Corporations and Commercial 
Code (hereinafter the "Division of Corporations"), which indicates 
that SLIC was dissolved on December 30, 1965 (R. 000 41). 
2. The Articles of Dissolution filed by SLIC, which 
were verified by Evelyn Boyce as the Vice President, and by Laron 
Boyce as the Secretary, state in part as follows: 
All remaining property and assets of the 
corporation have been distributed among its 
shareholders, in accordance with their respec-
tive rights and interests. 
(R. 000 39.) 
3. The Salt Lake Investment Company's sole remaining 
former shareholders, Lois P. Connell and Evelyn P. Boyce, conveyed 
by quit-claim deeds whatever interests they may have owned in the 
Amis No. 1 patented placer mining claim to James T. Jensen, Jerry 
J. Jensen and Dix Jensen. See (1) Quit-Claim Deed, dated November 
244903 1 
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4, 1993, executed by Jolene Woodland as attorney-in-fact for Lois 
P. Connell (R. 000 30), (2) a Power of Attorney, dated August 16, 
1993, executed by Lois P. Connell, granting a power of attorney to 
said Jolene Woodland as to property in the State of Utah (R. 000 
33) , and (3) a Quit-Claim Deed, dated November 5, 1993, executed by 
Evelyn P. Boyce (R. 000 32). 
4. Lois P. Connell and Evelyn P. Boyce were the 
President and Vice President, respectively, and were both direc-
tors, of The Salt Lake Investment Company at the time of its 
dissolution. See SLIC's Statement of Intent to Dissolve (R. 000 
36) . 
5. SLIC commenced the underlying action by filing its 
Complaint on October 21, 1994. (R. 000 5.) 
6. On January 3, 1995, the Jensens filed a Motion to 
Dismiss, or Alternatively, for Summary Judgment (R. 000 9), which 
was based on the grounds that (1) SLIC had dissolved in 1965 and 
therefore did not exist, and (2) SLIC's sole remaining former 
shareholders had quit-claimed their interests, if any, in the Amis 
No. 1 claim to the Jensens. 
7. In connection with their Motion to Dismiss, or 
Alternatively, for Summary Judgment, the Jensens submitted 
certified copies of the following documents: (1) SLIC's Statement 
of Intent to Dissolve, dated June 18, 1965 (R. 000 36); (2) SLIC's 
Articles of Dissolution, dated December 29, 1965 (R. 000 40); and 
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(3) Certification of Voluntary Dissolution, dated January 5, 1995, 
issued by the Division of Corporations, which indicates that SLIC 
was dissolved on December 30, 1965 (R. 000 41); (4) Quit-Claim 
Deed, dated November 4, 1993, executed by Jolene Woodland as 
attorney-in-fact for Lois P. Connell (R. 000 30); (5) a Power of 
Attorney, dated August 16, 1993, executed by Lois P. Connell, 
granting a power of attorney to said Jolene Woodland as to property 
in the State of Utah (R. 000 33); and (6) a Quit-Claim Deed, dated 
November 5, 1993, executed by Evelyn P. Boyce (R. 000 32). 
8. Treating the Jensens' motion as one for summary 
judgment, on March 27, 1995, the lower court issued its Ruling on 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, for Summary 
Judgment, in which the court granted summary judgment, concluding 
that SLIC had been dissolved in 1965, and therefore lacked the 
capacity to sue or be sued. (R. 000 162.) The court also rejected 
SLIC's argument that, even if SLIC were dissolved, SLIC could 
nevertheless maintain its quiet title action as part of the 
"winding-up" process under Utah statutory law. The court concluded 
that "30 years is far beyond a reasonable time to wind-up the 
activities of a corporation." (Ruling, at 3.) 
9. On May 9, 1995, SLIC filed a "Motion to Alter and 
Amend Judgment (Order)". (R. 000 189.) 
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10. On June 9, 1995, the trial court issued a Ruling on 
Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, in which the court 
denied the motion. (R. 000 232.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING SUMMA-
RY JUDGMENT, AND CONCLUDING THAT SLIC LACKS 
STANDING TO SUE OR BE SUED. 
In 1965, SLIC filed its Statement of Intent to Dissolve 
and its Articles of Dissolution. Thus, in 1965, SLIC intended to 
dissolve, and did so. From 1965 until it filed this action in 
October 1994, SLIC transacted no business, paid no taxes, filed no 
annual statements, conducted no annual shareholders' meetings, and 
engaged in no other corporate activity of any type. In January 
1995, the Division of Corporations issued a Certification of 
Voluntary Dissolution, which reflects that SLIC was in fact 
dissolved effective December 30, 1965. Consequently, SLIC lacked 
standing to sue or be sued. Accordingly, the trial court properly 
granted summary judgment. 
Under the version of Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-101 (1953; 
1973 Repl. Vol.) that was in effect in 1965, however, a corpora-
tion's existence was "continued," notwithstanding its dissolution, 
"for the purpose of winding up its affairs in respect to any 
property and assets which have not been distributed or otherwise 
disposed of prior to such dissolution[. ] " (Emphasis added.) 
However, 30 years is too long for a dissolved corporation to wind 
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up its affairs, and therefore, the lower court properly granted 
summary judgment. 
Finally, although there are no Utah cases on this issue, 
the courts of a number of other states have held that title to the 
property of a dissolved corporation vests by operation of law in 
the former shareholders upon the expiration of the statutory period 
for actions to be brought by or against the dissolved corporation. 
In the present case, SLIC's sole remaining former shareholders, 
Lois P. Connell and Evelyn P. Boyce (who were also officers and 
directors of SLIC at the time of SLIC's dissolution) , each conveyed 
by quit-claim deeds in 1993 their interests, if any, in the Amis 
No. 1 claim to the Jensens. Consequently, even assuming arguendo 
that SLIC had theretofore still possessed any interest in Amis No. 
1, Connell and Boyce, as SLIC's sole remaining former shareholders, 
conveyed such interest to the Jensens. Therefore, even if SLIC had 
the capacity to sue, which it does not, SLIC has no remaining 
interest in Amis No. 1. 
POINT II. THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING SLIC'S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND THE 
JUDGMENT. 
For the same reasons that the lower court did not err in 
granting summary judgment, the court also did not abuse its 
discretion in denying SLIC's motion to alter or amend the judgment. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING SUMMA-
RY JUDGMENT, AND CONCLUDING THAT SLIC LACKS 
STANDING TO SUE OR BE SUED. 
A. SLIC Was Dissolved in 1965. and Therefore. 
SLIC Is Legally Dead. Lacks Any Corporate 
Existence and Lacks the Capacity to Sue, 
It is fundamental that a corporation is an artificial 
entity created by law, capable of acting through its officers and 
agents. See, e.g. . Tuttle v. Hi-Land Dairyman's Ass'n, 10 Utah 2d 
195, 350 P.2d 616, 617-18 (1960); Utah State Building Commission v. 
Great American Indemnity Co.. 105 Utah 11, 140 P.2d 763, 767 
(1943) . The dissolution of a corporation terminates its corporate 
life. See Mackay & Knobel Enterprises. Inc. v. Teton Van Gas. 
Inc. . 23 Utah 2d 200, 460 P.2d 828, 829 (1969) (distinguishing 
between suspension and dissolution of a corporation, Court stated 
that "the term 'suspended' itself imports a temporary restriction 
of function of the corporation, the meaning of which is something 
less than the termination of the corporate life as brought about by 
dissolution. ", (emphasis added) ) . 
It is undisputed that in 1965 SLIC filed its Statement of 
Intent to Dissolve and its Articles of Dissolution. Thus, in 1965, 
SLIC intended to dissolve, and did so. From 1965 until it filed 
this action in October 1994, SLIC transacted no business, paid no 
taxes, filed no annual statements, conducted no annual sharehold-
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e r s ' meetings, and engaged in no other corporate a c t i v i t y of any 
type. In shor t , i t was l ega l ly dead. Accordingly, i t lacked 
standing to sue. 
SLIC argues, however, tha t i t was not dissolved because 
the Secretary of S ta te purportedly fa i l ed to i ssue a c e r t i f i c a t e of 
d i s so lu t ion , as he was required to do by law.4 Regardless of 
whether a c e r t i f i c a t e of d i s so lu t ion was ever issued, i t i s r ead i ly 
evident tha t both SLIC i t s e l f and the S ta te of Utah have regarded 
SLIC as having been dissolved since 1965. Indeed, as indica ted 
above, in January 1995, the Division of Corporations issued a 
Ce r t i f i c a t i on of Voluntary Dissolut ion, which r e f l e c t s t ha t SLIC 
was in fact dissolved e f fec t ive December 30, 1965. In shor t , 
notwithstanding SLIC's a s se r t i ons to the contrary, SLIC has long 
been dissolved, and now lacks any corporate ex i s tence . According-
ly , the t r i a l court did not e r r in grant ing summary judgment. 
4
 See Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-88 (1973 Repl. Vol . ) , which provides in 
per t inent par t as follows: 
16-10-88. Piling of art ic les of dissolut ion. - -
Duplicate o r ig ina l s of such a r t i c l e s of d issolu t ion 
shal l be delivered to the secretary of s t a t e . If the 
secretary of s t a t e finds that such a r t i c l e s of dissolu-
t ion conform to law, he sha l l , when a l l fees have been 
paid as in t h i s act prescribed: 
(3) Issue a c e r t i f i c a t e of d issolut ion to which 
he shal l aff ix the other duplicate o r ig ina l . 
(Emphasis added.) 
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B. As a Matter of Law, 30 Years Is Too Long for a 
Corporation to "Wind Up" Its Affairs. 
SLIC also argues that even if it had in fact been 
dissolved, it nevertheless could maintain this action on the basis 
that "a dissolved corporation retains title to its assets and 
retains its corporate existence for the purpose of protecting its 
assets and winding up its affairs." (Appellant's Brief, at 7-8.) 
The applicable Utah statute, Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-101 (1953; 1973 
Repl. Vol.) , which is quoted in the addendum hereto, is the version 
of such statute effective at the time of SLIC's dissolution. Under 
that statute, a corporation's existence is "continued," notwith-
standing its dissolution, "for the purpose of winding up its 
affairs in respect to any property and assets which have not been 
distributed or otherwise disposed of prior to such dissolution[.]" 
(Emphasis added.) 
By comparison, the version of Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100 
in effect in 1965 provided for a two-year "survival period" during 
which actions could be brought by or against a dissolved corpora-
tion: 
The dissolution of a corporation . . . 
shall not take away or impair any remedy 
available to or against the corporation, its 
directors, officers, or shareholders, for any 
right or claim existing, or any liability 
incurred, prior to such dissolution if action 
or other proceeding thereon is commenced 
within two years after the date of such disso-
lution. . . . 
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Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100 (1953; 1973 Repl. Vol.) (emphasis 
added) . I t i s evident from the above-quoted s t a t u t e tha t the 
Legis la ture was seeking to bring some f i n a l i t y to a co rpora t ion ' s 
existence upon d i s so lu t ion by imposing in effect a two-year s t a t u t e 
of l im i t a t i ons for ac t ions by or agains t a dissolved corporat ion. 
Recognizing, however, tha t there might be some loose s t r i n g s tha t 
could not (or for some reason did not) get resolved within the two-
year period, the Legis la ture provided in § 16-10-101 for the more 
open-ended "winding up" period, leaving i t to the courts to 
determine whether spec i f ic a c t i v i t y could properly be regarded as 
winding-up a c t i v i t y . I t i s unreasonable to be l ieve tha t the 
Legis la ture ever envisioned tha t an ac t ion brought 30 years a f t e r 
a corporat ion dissolved, e i t h e r by or agains t the corpora t ion , ' 
could reasonably be regarded as winding-up a c t i v i t y . Any such 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the s t a t u to ry language would s t r e t c h the meaning 
of the language to an absurdi ty . 5 
5
 Indeed, in the recent case of Holman v. C a H i s t e r , Duncan & Nebeker, 
905 P.2d 895 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), t h i s Court affirmed the t r i a l cour t ' s 
d ismissal of an act ion for l ega l malpractice that was commenced in July 1993 by 
a corporation that had been invo luntar i ly d i s so lved September 1982 for f a i l u r e 
to pay s t a t e t a x e s . In May 1983, the corporation f i l e d Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 
In November 1984, the corporation reached a sett lement with the IRS regarding 
payment of delinquent t a x e s . The a l l eged malpractice involved the corporat ion's 
l e g a l counse l ' s f a i l u r e t o include the IRS sett lement in the approved plan of 
reorganizat ion in the bankruptcy proceedings. The t r i a l court dismissed the 
ac t ion on the b a s i s that the l e g a l malpractice claim "arose a f t er corporate 
d i s s o l u t i o n and was not part of corporate wind-up a c t i v i t i e s . " 905 P.2d at 896. 
Cit ing the former Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100 and -101, as wel l as 
s ec t i on 108(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 108(a) (West 1993), t h i s 
Court affirmed the t r i a l cour t ' s d ismissa l of the ac t ion , s t a t i n g as fo l lows: 
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SLIC argues, however, that Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-101 
contains no time limitation for a corporation to complete its 
winding-up activity, and "[t]here is no reason in logic or policy 
for imposing such." (Appellant's Brief, at 20.) On the contrary, 
there are numerous reasons, both in logic and policy, for refusing 
to permit a dissolved corporation's winding-up activity to drag on 
indefinitely. First and foremost, such a principle encourages 
dissolving corporations to wind up their affairs expeditiously, 
while records are still available and memories are fresh. It 
encourages the dissolving corporation to make sure, for the benefit 
of both its shareholders and its creditors, that it has inventoried 
and accounted for its assets as well as its liabilities. It 
ensures that claims belonging to a corporation, as well as claims 
against it, are asserted and resolved while they are fresh, and 
while people knowledgeable regarding such claims are still around. 
For the reasons discussed above, the action filed by SLIC 
cannot reasonably be regarded as falling within the "winding up" 
extension of corporate existence contained in Utah Code Ann. § 16-
10-101. Accordingly, the lower court properly granted summary 
j udgment. 
We conclude that these statutes do not allow a 
dissolved corporation to pursue claims for malpractice 
after it has ceased to exist in any manner as a corpo-
rate entity. Clearly, Andersen's Ford, Inc. lacked any 
capacity to bring this suit in 1994, almost ten years 
after its legal existence had ceased. 
905 P .2d a t 897 . 
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In support of i t s pos i t ion , however, SLIC r e l i e s on 
Falconaero Enterpr ise , Inc . v. Valley Investment Co,. 16 Utah 2d 
77, 395 P.2d 915 (1964). (See Appel lan t ' s Brief, a t 12-13.) 
SLIC's r e l i ance on Falconaero i s misplaced. In tha t case, there 
was no ind ica t ion as to how long the p l a i n t i f f corporat ion had been 
dissolved before i t commenced an ac t ion agains t the defendant. 
Indeed, for a l l we know, the s u i t may have been commenced within 
the two-year survival period provided in the then-appl icable Utah 
Code Ann. § 16-10-100 (1973 Repl. V o l . ) . Falconaero provides no 
support for SLIC's contention tha t a corporat ion tha t has been 
dissolved for 30 years never theless has standing to sue. 
SLIC a l so r e l i e s on Mackay & Knobel Ente rpr i ses , Inc . v . 
Teton Van Gas. I n c . , 23 Utah 2d 200, 460 P.2d 828 (1969), in which 
the court s t a t ed in dicta 6 as follows: 
We accept the fact tha t there are good 
and su f f i c i en t reasons for t h i s declared 
pol icy of the law tha t a corporat ion, even 
though dissolved, i s able to sue and p ro tec t 
i t s a s s e t s . This enables i t to b e t t e r d i s -
charge the du t ies the law imposes upon i t : to 
pay i t s t axes ; to pay i t s c r ed i t o r s and to 
meet i t s ob l iga t ions to stock holders who have 
invested in i t . 
6
 Unlike the present case , Mackav & Knobel involved a corporation that 
was merely "suspended11 rather than d i s so lved . The p l a i n t i f f corporation in 
Mackav & Knobel f i l e d an act ion against the defendant to recover damages for the 
destruct ion of a serv ice s t a t i o n by f i r e , which the p l a i n t i f f claimed was caused 
by the defendant. Several months a f t e r the s u i t was f i l e d , the p l a i n t i f f 
corporation was suspended for f a i l u r e to pay i t s corporate franchise t a x e s . The 
defendant moved to dismiss the ac t ion because the p l a i n t i f f lacked the l e g a l 
capacity to sue as a r e s u l t of i t s suspension. The t r i a l court granted the 
motion, and the p l a i n t i f f appealed. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reversed. 
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460 P.2d at 829 (emphasis added) . In the present case, there is no 
suggestion that SLIC has paid any taxes in the last 30 years, filed 
any annual statements, or complied with any other requirements 
imposed on existing corporations, or that it has any on-going 
obligations to its former stockholders or its creditors. Conse-
quently, there is simply no rational basis for permitting it, a 
corporation that has been dissolved and legally dead for 30 years, 
to suddenly emerge from its grave in order to maintain a lawsuit. 
In its brief, SLIC also raises a number of hypothetical 
questions in an attempt to show the potential ramifications of the 
lower court's decision on other cases. (See Appellant's Brief, at 
19-20.) While some of the questions may be analytically or 
intellectually interesting, they are simply not questions that are 
raised by the facts of this particular case, and therefore, they 
need not be resolved in this appeal. For example, SLIC questions 
what the effect of the lower court's decision would be, hypotheti-
cally, if the dissolved corporation had 700 shareholders. In the 
present case, however, SLIC has two former shareholders. There-
fore, the issue of a corporation with 700 shareholders simply need 
not be addressed unless and until such a case is presented. 
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C. Upon the Expiration of the "Winding-Up" Peri-
od, Title to Any Remaining Corporate Property 
Vested by Operation of Law in the Former 
Shareholders. SLIC#s Sole Remaining Former 
Shareholders Have Conveyed by Quit-Claim Deeds 
Whatever Interests They May Have Had in Amis 
No. 1 to the Jensens. 
This action apparently was brought by SLIC's sole 
remaining former shareholders, Lois P. Connell and Evelyn P. Boyce, 
in the corporation's name. In addition to being SLIC's sole 
remaining former shareholders, Connell and Boyce were also officers 
and directors of SLIC at the time of SLIC's dissolution. 
In November 1993, Connell and Boyce each conveyed by 
quit-claim deeds their interests in the Amis No. 1 claim to the 
Jensens. Consequently, even assuming arguendo that SLIC had 
theretofore still possessed any interest in Amis No. 1, Connell and 
Boyce, as SLIC's sole remaining former shareholders, conveyed such 
interest to the Jensens. Therefore, even if SLIC had the capacity 
to sue, which it does not, SLIC has no remaining interest in Amis 
No. 1. 
SLIC also argues that the quit-claim deeds conveying the 
subject mining claim from Connell and Boyce to the Jensens are 
irrelevant to the present action because, among other things, Boyce 
and Connell did not have title, and because the deeds were obtained 
by fraud (although SLIC does not provide even the slightest clue as 
to the specifics of the alleged fraud). (See Appellant's Brief, at 
22.) 
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Although there apparently is no Utah decision addressing 
this issue, the courts in a number of other jurisdictions have held 
that title to the property of a dissolved corporation vests by 
operation of law in the former shareholders upon the expiration of 
the statutory period for actions to be brought by or against the 
dissolved corporation. See, e.g. , Levy v. Liebling. 238 F.2d 505, 
507 (7th Cir. 1956), cert, denied, 353 U.S. 936 (1957); Smith v. 
Long, 76 Idaho 265, 281 P.2d 483, 486 (1955) ("Upon dissolution of 
a corporation, the corporate property vests in its stockholders, 
subject to the liabilities of the corporation. The quitclaim deeds 
from the heirs of the stockholders, who died seized of the property 
of the Sunnyside Orchard Company, are effective to convey to the 
plaintiffs whatever title those stockholders and their heirs held 
in the land involved." (citations omitted)); Jenot v. White 
Mountain Acceptance Corp.. 124 N.H. 701, 474 A.2d 1382, 1385-86 
(1984) ("We subscribe to the general rule that after the dissolu-
tion of a corporation its property passes to its stockholders 
subject to the payment of the corporate debts." (quoting Hampton v. 
Hampton Beach Improvement Co., 107 N.H. 89, 94, 218 A.2d 442, 446-
47 (1966) ) ; Kirby Royalties, Inc. v. Texaco Inc. 461 P.2d 282, 283-
84 (Wyo. 1969) . Under these authorities, title to the subject 
mining claim passed by operation of law to Connell and Boyce, as 
former shareholders of Plaintiff, who in turn conveyed their 
interests in the property to the Jensens. 
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SLIC places great emphasis on Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-
1405(2) (a), which was enacted in 1992 as part of Utah's Revised 
Business Corporation Act, and which provides that dissolution of a 
corporation does not transfer title to the corporation's property.7 
SLIC argues that " [i]f dissolution of a corporation automatically 
passes title to its assets to the shareholders, there would be no 
need for a statute such as the said Section 16-10a-1405, UCA, which 
provides that a dissolved corporation retains title to its assets 
and retains its corporate capacity to protect and dispose of its 
assets." (Appellant's Brief, at 23.) 
SLIC's argument turns logic on its head: if Utah's 
business corporation statutes had previously provided that title to 
a corporation's assets did not vest in the corporation's sharehold-
ers after dissolution, there would have been no need for the 
Legislature in 1992 to add Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1405 (2) (a) , 
which, as indicated above, provides that the dissolution of a 
corporation does not transfer title to the corporation's property. 
The addition of this provision strongly suggests that the Legisla-
ture was attempting to reverse the general rule that after 
dissolution of a corporation, the corporation's property passes by 
operation of law to its shareholders. 
7
 The statute is quoted in the Addendum hereto. 
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For the foregoing reasons, it is apparent that the lower 
court did not err in granting summary judgment, and concluding that 
SLIC lacked standing to sue. 
POINT II. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING SLIC#S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND THE 
JUDGMENT. 
SLIC's "Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (Order)" was 
nothing more than a re-hashing of the issues that SLIC had raised 
during the briefing on the Jensens' Motion to Dismiss, or Alterna-
tively, for Summary Judgment. Thus, for the same reasons set forth 
above, SLIC lacked standing to sue or be sued, and the lower court 
correctly granted summary judgment, and did not abuse its discre-
tion in denying SLIC's motion to alter or amend the judgment. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
SLIC has been legally dead for almost 30 years, and 
therefore, it lacks the legal capacity to sue. Additionally, as a 
matter of law, 30 years is too long a period of time for a 
dissolved corporation to wind up its affairs. Moreover, even if 
SLIC had the legal capacity to sue, its sole remaining former 
shareholders, who were also officers and directors of SLIC at the 
time of its dissolution, conveyed by quit-claim deeds their 
interests in the Amis No. 1 claim to the Jensens. For these 
reasons, the summary judgment granted by the lower court should be 
affirmed. 
244903 1 
-30-
DATED this j^ _jf~day of June, 1996. 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Appellees James T. 
Jensen, Jerry J. Jensen and Dix 
Jensen 
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ADDENDUM 
STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS OF CENTRAL 
IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-101 (1973 Repl. Vol.): 
16-10-101. Continuation of corporate 
existence to wind up after dissolution.- -
Notwithstanding the dissolution of a corpora-
tion either (1) by the issuance of a certifi-
cate of dissolution by the secretary of state, 
or (2) by a decree of court, or (3) by expira-
tion of its period of duration, the corporate 
existence of such corporation shall neverthe-
less continue for the purpose of winding up 
its affairs in respect to any property and 
assets which have not been distributed or 
otherwise disposed of prior to such dissolu-
tion, and to effect such purpose such corpora-
tion may sell or otherwise dispose of such 
property and assets, sue and be sued, con-
tract, and exercise all other incidental and 
necessary powers. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100 (1973 Repl. Vol.): 
Survival of remedy after dissolution.- -
The dissolution of a corporation either (1) by 
the issuance of a certificate of dissolution 
by the secretary of state, or (2) by a decree 
of court when the court has not liquidated the 
assets and business of the corporation as 
provided.in this act, or (3) by expiration of 
its period of duration, shall not take away or 
impair any remedy available to or against the 
corporation, its directors, officers, or 
shareholders, for any right or claim existing, 
or any liability incurred, within two years 
after the date of such dissolution. Any such 
action or proceeding by or against the corpo-
ration may be prosecuted or defended by the 
corporation in its corporate name. The share-
holders, directors and officers shall have 
power to take such corporate or other action 
as shall be appropriate to protect such reme-
dy, right or claim. If such corporation was 
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dissolved by the expiration of its period of 
duration, such corporation may amend its 
articles of incorporation at any [time] during 
such period of two years so as to extend its 
period of duration. 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-87 (1973 Repl. Vol.): 
Articles of dissolution.--If voluntary 
dissolution proceedings have not been revoked, 
then when all debts, liabilities and obliga-
tions of the corporation have been paid and 
discharged, or adequate provision has been 
made therefor, and all of the remaining prop-
erty and assets of the corporation have been 
distributed to its shareholders, articles of 
dissolution shall be executed in duplicate by 
the corporation by its president or a vice-
president and by its secretary or an assistant 
secretary, and verified by one of the officers 
signing such statement, which statement shall 
set forth: 
(a) The name of the corporation. 
(b) That the secretary of state has 
theretofore filed a statement of intent to 
dissolve the corporation, and the date on 
which such statement was filed. 
(c) That all debts, obligations and 
liabilities of the corporation have been paid 
and discharged or that adequate provision has 
been made therefor. 
(d) That all the remaining property and 
assets of the corporation have been distribut-
ed among its shareholders in accordance with 
their respective rights and interests. 
(e) That there are no suits pending 
against the corporation in any court, or that 
adequate provision has been made for the 
satisfaction of any judgment, order or decree 
which may be entered against it in any pending 
suit. 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-88 (1973 Repl. Vol.): 
Filing of articles of dissolution.- -
Duplicate originals of such articles of disso-
lution shall be delivered to the secretary of 
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state. If the secretary of state finds that 
such articles of dissolution conform to law, 
he shall, when all fees have been paid as in 
this prescribed: 
(1) Endorse on each of such duplicate 
originals the word "filed," and the month, day 
and year of the filing thereof. 
(2) File one of such duplicate originals 
in his office. 
(3) Issue a certificate of dissolution 
to which he shall affix the other duplicate 
original. 
The certificate of dissolution, together 
with the duplicate original of the articles of 
dissolution affixed thereto by the secretary 
of state, shall be returned to the representa-
tive of the dissolved corporation. Upon the 
issuance of such certificate of dissolution 
the existence of the corporation shall cease, 
except for the purpose of suits, other pro-
ceedings and appropriate corporate action by 
shareholders, directors and officers as pro-
vided in this act. 
5. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1405 (1995 Repl. Vol.): 
Effect of dissolution. 
(1) A dissolved corporation continues its 
corporate existence but may not carry on any 
business except that appropriate to wind up 
and liquidate its business and affairs, in-
cluding: 
(a) collecting its assets; 
(b) disposing of its properties that 
will not be distributed in kind to its share-
holders ; 
(c) discharging or making provision 
for discharging its liabilities; 
(d) distributing its remaining 
property among its shareholders according to 
their interests; and 
(e) doing every other act necessary 
to wind up and liquidate its business and 
affairs. 
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(2) Dissolution of a corporation does 
not: 
(a) transfer title to the 
corporation's property. 
(b) prevent transfer of its shares 
or securities, although the authorization to 
dissolve may provide for closing the 
corporation's share transfer records; 
(c) subject its directors or offi-
cers to standards of conduct different from 
those prescribe in Part 8; 
(d) change: 
(i) quorum or voting require-
ments for its board of directors or 
shareholders; 
(ii) provisions for selection, 
resignation, or removal of its di-
rectors or officers or both; or 
(iii) provisions for amending 
its bylaws or its articles of incor-
poration; 
(e) prevent commencement of a pro-
ceeding by or against the corporation in its 
corporate name; 
(f) abate or suspend a proceeding 
pending by or against the corporation on the 
effective date of dissolution; or 
(g) terminate the authority of the 
registered agent of the corporation. 
ADDITIONAL IMPORTANT PAPERS CONTAINED IN THE RECORD 
1. Submission of Certified Copies of Documents Relied Upon 
in Support of Jensen Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or 
Alternatively, for Summary Judgment. (R. 000 45) 
244903 1 -36-
jtf)p-
DEREK LANGTON (4068) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for defendants James T. Jensen, 
Jerry J- Jensen and Dix Jensen 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COM-
PANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
WILFORD H. HANSEN STONE QUAR-
RIES, INC., a Utah corpora-
tion, SHARRON KILLION, JAMES 
T. JENSEN, JERRY J. JENSEN, 
DIX JENSEN, and all other 
persons unknown, claiming any 
right, title, estate or inter-
est in, or lien upon the real 
property described in the 
pleading adverse to the plain-
tiff's ownership, or clouding 
its title thereto, 
Defendants. 
SUBMISSION OF CERTIFIED 
COPIES OF DOCUMENTS RELIED 
UPON IN SUPPORT OF JENSEN 
DEFENDANTS1 MOTION TO DIS-
MISS, OR ALTERNATIVELY, FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 940400611 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
• • • • * * * 
As indicated in the Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
in Support of Defendants' Motion To Dismiss, or Alternatively, for 
Summary Judgment, dated December 30, 1994, the defendants James T. 
Jensen, Jerry J. Jensen and Dix Jensen (hereinafter the "Jensen 
000 148739 
Defendants") were in the process of obtaining certified copies of 
the various documents that were attached collectively as Exhibits 
"A" and "B" to said Memorandum. The Jensen Defendants have now 
obtained and submit herewith certified copies of such documents, 
which are attached hereto as Exhibits "A" and "B". 
DATED this day of January, 1995. 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
148739 
DEREK LANGTON v — y r 
Attorneys for defendants James 
T. Jensen, Jerry J. Jensen 
and Dix Jensen 
2-
nnn A A 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this jT day of January, 1995, 
I caused to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing SUBMISSION OF CERTIFIED COPIES OF 
DOCUMENTS RELIED UPON IN SUPPORT OF JENSEN DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
DISMISS, OR ALTERNATIVELY, FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, to: 
Robert C. Cummings 
225 South 200 East, #150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
148739 •3- 000 43 
Tab A 
CERTIFICATION OF 
VOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION 
THE UTAH DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS AND COMMERCIAL 
CODE HEREBY CERTIFIES THAT 
THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COMPANY 
filed Articles of Incorporation on February 19, 1955, 
filed Articles of Dissolution with this office on 
December 30, 1965 
and that the above named corporation was dissolved on 
December 30, 1965, 
AS APPEARS OF RECORD IN THE OFFICES OF THE DIVISION. 
THE UTAH DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS AND COMMERCIAL 
CODE HEREBY CERTIFIES THAT the attached is a true, correct, and 
complete copy of Articles of Dissolution of 
THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COMPANY 
and the endorsements thereon, as the same is taken from and 
compared with the original filed in the office of the Division on 
December 30, 1965, and now remaining on file and of record 
therein. 
AS APPEARS OF RECORD IN THE OFFICES OF THE DIVISION. 
File Number: CO 030471 
6 U ' 
Filing Fee: $1.0u ^ Fue in Duplicate 
,.p^inals 
ARUCLES OF DlSSOLUTlptylTM^ Or aTMt 
PURSUANT TO SECTION 87 <5F THE 
UTAH BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT _ ,
 0 oi 
OF flfiffX30 PM 2 2 
THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COMPANY 
(Corporate name) 
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 16-10-87 of the Utah Business 
Corporation Act, the undersigned corporation adopts the following Articles 
of Dissolution for the purpose of dissolving the corporation: 
FIRST: The name of the Corporation is ^___,_^ 
"The Salt Lake Investment "Company" 
SECOND: A statement of intent to dissolve the corporation was filed 
by the Secretary of State of Utah on December 28 , 19 65 
pursuant to the provisions of Section 16-10-80 of the Utah Business 
Corporation Act. 
THIRD: All debts, obligations and liabilities of the corporation have 
been paid and discharged, or adequate provision has been made therefor. 
FOURTH: All remaining property and assets of the corporation have been 
distributed among its shareholders, in accordance with their respective 
rights and interests. 
FIFTH: There are no suits pending against the corporation in any court 
in respect of which adequate provision has not been made for the satisfaction 
of any judgment, order or decree which may be entered against it. 
Dated 29 Scomber 
_. 19 65 
THE SALT LAKE IhVESTMSNT COMPANY 
(Exact corporate name) ^ 
ItjT Vice-presi<tent 
""- Secretary 
By. 
By. 
Its 
STATE OF _ 
COUNTY OF" 
U t a h 
SALT LAKE 
I, nee* A L' fd V<u 
ss 
«? L<^-' 
that on this7 thirtieth 
appeared before me LARQN A. BQYCE 
_, a notary public, do hereby certify 
day of December
 9 19 65 personall 
declared that he is the Secretary 
who, being by me first duly sworn 
of 
-The gait I^k» Investment Company** 
That lie signed the foregoing document as such secretary of the corpora-
tion, and that the statements therein contained are true. 
In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and seal this 30th 
d ay of D*cambar * A. D. 1965 . 
My Commission expires yc-t^wc*-*^-* / K t $ L ^  
' Notary 
In Re: 
11r r its. wi 
Dissolution /X/ ^
 cil;
1
 j . ^ OF STATE 
Petition for _ of " No, 
Withdrawal / / 
in/* PIT 28 P»i 5 08ERTIFICATE OF 
THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COMPANY * U b TAX COMMISSION 
A Utah /%/ Foreign / / Corporation 
Incorporated or qualified in the State of Utah 
This is to certify that all fees, taxes, penalties, interest and costs due 
the state and imposed upon: 
The Salt Lake Investment Company 
1200 Charlton Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
a corporation incorporated A / qualified /_/ under the laws of the State of Utah, have 
been satisfied and discharged. 
This tax clearance certificate expires
 o n December 315 19 ^5 
in accordance with the provision checked below: 
/ / If this certificate is not used in a legal proceeding for the dissolution 
or withdrawal of the above named corporation within ninety days of date 
issued, as shown below, it will become invalid. 
jJLj If the above named corporation is not dissolved or withdrawn on or before 
December 31 § 19 65 , the corporation will become 
liable for the filing of a Utah corporation franchise tax return for the 
period then ended, and for the payment of the tax due in connection there-
with. 
DATED this 27th day of December , 196*5 . 
TAX COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
By. / r ^ u ^ V / ^ ^ ^ 
Horace Gaile^l nf lO 3 8 
Title: Supervising Auditor UUU 
** Resolution adopted a t a spec ia l meeting of the Board of Di rec tors of the 
Sal t Lake Investment Company, held on June 1 s t , 1965: 
"BE IT RESOLVED, by the d i r e c t o r s of the SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
a Utah corporat ion: 
11
 (1) That corporation cease to do, and does cease, business forthwith, 
that i t se l l a l l of i t s assets at the most favorable prices obtainable; that 
i t pay, or make provision for the payment of a l l of i t s debts and l i a b i l i t i e s ; 
and that 1 1 distribute the assets remaining after payment of i t s debts and 
l i ab i l i t i e s ; pro rata among i t s several shareholders in complete cancellation 
of a l l of i t s issued and outstanding capital stock; or in the case of failure 
or inabil i ty to sel l any class, or portion of any class, of i t s assets, that 
such assets be distributed in kind, together with any cash to the stockholders, 
as their interests may appear, in complete cancellation or redemption of a l l 
the issued and outstanding stock of the corporation, and, that i t wind up i t s 
affairs , and then voluntarily dissolve a l l as provided by the laws of the State 
of Utah " ** 
« « » « « * « « n 
BBSOLUTION ADOPTED AT A SPECIAL WELTING OF THE SHAREHOLDERS OF THE SALT LAKE 
INVESTMENT COMPANY, held on June 11th, 1965: 
"RESOLVED, by the shareholders of the Sal t Lake Investment Company, a Utah 
corporat ion, i n meeting assembled: 
"(1) That a l l of the recommendations of the board of d i r e c t o r s of t h i s cor -
porat ion concerning i t s complete l i q u id a t i o n , d i s t r i b u t i o n of a s s e t s , d i s s o l u -
t i o n , and plan for carrying out the l i qu ida t ion and d i s t r i b u t i o n of i t s a s s e t s , 
and tho methods and procedures for carrying out such p lan , and the t r ansac t ions 
contemplated thereby, as set fo r th i n the minutes of a spec ia l meeting of the 
board of d i r e c t o r s of thr corporat ion held on June 1 s t , 19t>5, and presented a t 
t h i s meeting, be, and they arerhereby approved, and, the plan thereby proposed 
i s hereby, adopted; M 
MTRaCT FROM HIE MINUTES OF THE SPECIAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS OF THE SALT LAKE 
INVL3TMENT COMPANY, held on June 11th, 1965: 
"The chairwoman of the meeting then di rected tha t a copy of the minutes of 
the specia l meeting of the board of d i r e c t o r s of t h i s corporat ion, aforementioned, 
which c o n s t i t u t e s the bas is for the ac t ion taken and adopted a t t h i s meeting be 
attached t o , and incorporated a s a par t of the minutes of t h i s meeting, as f u l l y 
as i f again set fo r th h e r e i n . " 
•*/NOTE: The r e so lu t i on of the board of d i r e o t o r s of The Sa l t Lake Investment 
Company, adopted a t a meeting held June 1 s t , 1965, as f i r s t set out hereinabove, 
i s a t rue ex t rac t of par t of the r e so lu t ions adopted a t said meeting of the board 
of d i r e c t o r s on the t d a t e , end referred t o in the "ex t rac t " from the minutes of 
the specia l Shareholders* meating held June 11th, 1965, and made a par t of the 
minutes of said shareholders* meeting and incorporated t he re in by r e f e r e n c e . " / 
THE UTAH DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS AND COMMERCIAL 
CODE HEREBY CERTIFIES THAT the attached is a true, correct, and 
complete copy of Statement of Intent to Dissolve of 
THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COMPANY 
and the endorsements thereon, as the same is taken from and 
compared with the original filed in the office of the Division on 
December 28, 1965, and now remaining on file and of record 
therein. 
AS APPEARS OF RECORD IN THE OFFICES OF THE DIVISION. 
File Number: CO 030471 
... » l . ' 
vL v / f ' *-,* c/s- * y 
Filing Fee: $1.00 IW\ZIW F l l e i n D u P l i c 8 t e 
SECRETARY OF STATE O r i g i n a l s 
STATEMENT OF INTENT TO DISSOLVE 
^43^ 1?65 OCT 22 PM 3 40 
O'1 rJ - THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COMPANY - _ " . . . , . . , . , 
fl ( C o r p o r a t e Name)-
BY ACT OF THE CORPORATION 
To The S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e ^- '••"> l ; ,: ' 
of t h e S t a t e of U t a h : " r ^ c M *- ' fv™ y ""•••-
P u r s u a n t t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s of S e c t i o n 1 6 - 1 0 - 7 9 of t h e Utah 
B u s i n e s s C o r p o r a t i o n A c t , t h e u n d e r s i g n e d c o r p o r a t i o n s u b m i t s t h e 
f o l l o w i n g s t a t e m e n t of i n t e n t t o d i s s o l v e t h e c o r p o r a t i o n by a c t of 
t h e c o r p o r a t i o n . 
FIRST: The name of t h e c o r p o r a t i o n i s * 
"The Sa l t Lake Investment Company" 
SECOND: The names and r e s p e c t i v e a d d r e s s e s of I t s o f f i c e r s a r e : 
Name A d d r e s s 
Lois P. Connell P r e s i d e n t /jg Avila S t . . San Franc isco , Cal . 
Evelyn p. Rovne Vice P r e s i d e n t 1200 Charlton Ave.f Sa l t Lake n i t y . Utah. 
terQD A, Boyce ( ^ S e c r e t a r y ) 1300 Charlton Avonue 
^ T r e a s u r e r ) Sa l t Lai™ C i t y , Utah 
THIRD: The names and r e s p e c t i v e a d d r e s s e s of i t s d i r e c t o r s a r e : 
Name A d d r e s s 
Led a P. Connell LAQ AvJJa S t . , San Frai>cjLsco, Cal i fornia 
Fvpiyn P nnyn* 1 POO ftiarlton Ave., Salt Laics p i ty , Utah 
T „ A F»~ l O n n C k n « . 1 - t - A M A , r « Q o 1 + l o l r n V"H--.r I l i o V i Laron . Boyce 1200 ^ harl on ve.'. Salt Lake ^ ity'. Utah
FOURTH: The following resolution to dissolve the corporation was 
adopted by the shareholders of the corporation on June 11th, 
19 _#> .. (Attach a copy of resolution) 
TIPTH: The number of shares of the corporation outstanding at the 
time of such adoption was one hundred (100) ; and the number of shares 
entitled to vote thereon was: 
Class (Note 1) Number of Shares 
Common 100 
SIXTH: The number of shares voted for such resolution was IQQ 
and the number of shares Voted against such resolution was None 
SEVENTH: The number of shares of each class entitled to vote thereon as 
a class voted for and against such resolution, respectively, was: 
Number of Shares Voted 
Class For Against"" (note 1) 
Common 100 None 
(No classes of common and preferred stock exist) 
Dated June 18th ,19 65 
000 35 
T H E S A L T L A K E I H V E S T M E N T 
(Exact Name of Corporation) COMPANY 
M.r, y Vio6wPi"Q a latent. 
>
 I t s Secretary \ 
Note 1. If inappl icable , Inser t "Nunc;". 
STATE "OF UTAH ) 
) SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I , -liari-irac it. Callister—
 ? Q n o i a r y p u M l c > do hereby 
ce r t i fy "that on th i s w eighteenth - f ^ j ^? . * J u n e - , 19 65. 
personally appeared before qte laron A. Boyce who , /being by aie first 
duly sworn, declarod ttmt he fa the secretary %» treasurer of 
- T H E S A L T L A K E I N V E S T M E N T C O M P A N Y -
That Tie signed the foregoing document as such secretary-treasurer of the 
corporation, and that the statements there in contained are t rue. 
In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and seal t h i s ~I8th-
day of - J u n e - , A, 0. i96$ . 
My Commission expires {./) X^JUY - U2 /c;/6f^ -
" Notary Public 
Residing at Salt Lake City and 
County, State of Utah, 
TabB 
A*O « we* accoftoco MAIL TO 
"1 EHT 7 9 9 0 2 BK 3 2 9 0 PG 3 5 3 
MIHA B REID UTAH CO RECORDER BY V& 
1993 NOV 5 3:51 PH FEE 10.00 
RECORDED FOR PARSONS BEHLE & LATIHER 
- SPACE ABOVE THIS U N E TOR RECORDER'S LSE -
Power of Attorney 
Know All Men by These Presents: Thai /L0/<C £>. So 
the undersigned (jointly and severally, if more than one) hereby make, constitute and appoint 
-U^^£2zZi <AS&ffiA &A A/r^ 
my true and lawful Attorney for me and in my name, place and stead and for my use and benefit: 
(a) To ask. demand. $vt for, recover, collect and receive each and trcty sum of money, debt, account, legacy, bequest, interest, dividend, annuity 
and demand (which now Is or hereafter shall become due. owing ot payable) belonging to or claimed by me. and to use and take any lawful means for 
the recovery thereof by legal process or otherwise, and to execute and deliver a satisfaction or release therefor, together with the right and power to 
compromise or compound any claim or demand; 
(b) To exercise any or ad of the following powers as to real property, any interest therein and/or any building thereon: To contract for, purchase, 
receive and take possession thereof and of evidence of title thereto; to lease the same for any term or purpose, including leases for business, residence, 
and oil and/or mineral development: to sell, exchange, grant or convey the fame with or without warranty: and to mortgage, transfer in trust, or 
otherwise encumber or hypothecate the same to secure payment of a negotiable or non-negotiable note or performance of any obligation or agreement; 
(c) To exercise any or all of the following powers as 10 all kinds of personal property and goods, wares and merchandise, choses in action and other 
property In possession or in action: To contract for, buy, sell, exchange, indorse, transfer and in any legal manner d:al in and with the u m t : and to 
mortgage, transfer in trust, or otherwise encumber or hypothecate the same to secure payment of a negotiable or non-negotiable note or performance 
of any obligation or agreement: 
(d) To borrow money i r J to execute and deliver negotiable or non-negotiable notes therefor with or without security: and to loan money and receive 
negotiable or non«negotiabtc notes therefor with such security as he shall deem proper. 
it) To create, amend, supplement and terminate any trust and to instruct and advise the trustee of Mny trust wherein I am or may be trustor or 
benefkiarr; to represent and vote stock, exercise stock rights, accept and deal with any dividend, distribution or bonus, join in ant corporate financing, 
reorganization, merger, liquidation, cotvoltdation or other action and the extension, compromise, conversion, adjustment, enforcement or foreclosure, 
singly or in conjunction with others of any corporate stock, bond. note, debenture or other security; to compound, compromue. adjutt. settle and 
satisfy any obligation, secured or unsecured, owing by or to me and to give or accept any property and * or money whether or not equal to or less in 
value than the amount owing in payment, settlement or satisfaction thereof: 
( 0 To transact business of any kind w dass and as my act and deed to sign, execute, acknowledge and deliver any deed, lease, assignment or lease, 
covenant, indenture, indemnity, agreement, mortgage, deed of trust, assignment of mortgage or of the beneficial interest under deed of trust, extension 
or renewal of any obligation, subordination or waiver of priority, hypothecation, bottomry, charter-party, bill of lading, bill of sale. bill. bond. note, 
whether negotiable ot non«negotiabie. receipt, evidence of debt, full or partial release or satisfaction of mortgage, judgment and other debt. requeM lor 
partial or full reconveyance of deed of trust and such other Instruments in writing of any kind or class as may be necessary or proper in the premises. 
G i v i n g a n d G r a n t i n g wno my said Attorney full power and authority to do and perform all and every act and thing whatsoever requisite. 
necessary or appropriate to be done in and about the premises as fully to all intents and purpose* as I might or could do if personally present, hereby 
ratifying all that my said Attorney shall lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue of these presents. The powers and authority hereby conferred upon 
my said Attorney shall be applicable to all teal and personal property or interests therein now owned or hereafter required by me and wherever situate. 
My said Attorney is empowered hereby to determine in his sole discretion the time when, purpose for and manner in which any power herein conferred 
upon him shall be exercise, and the conditions, provisions and covenants of any instrument or document which may be executed by him pursuant 
hereto; and In the acquisition or disposition of real or personal proper!). m> said Attorney shall have exclusive power to fix the terms thereof for ca*h. 
credit and/or property, and If on credit with or without security 
The undersigned. If a married person, hereby further authorizes and empowers rm said Auorne>. as my duly authorized agent, to join in m> bchah. 
in the execution of any instrument by w-hich any community real property or any interest therein, now owned or hereafter acquired by rm spouve and 
myself, or either of us. is sold, leased, encumbered, or com eyed. 
When the context so requites, the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or neuter, and the singular number includes the plural. 
Witness my/our hand thU 16* ' Any of kX/&£/<J~
 % |QJ2J? 
Qy*^ £ &YL^4/ 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 
COUNTY OF / ^ ^ > A / ss. 
On/*>^/><;^ / £ . /wfrgft 
/-&t<* £L C<?)±SA,*r/S 
fore me a Notary Public in and for said County and State, personally appeared. 
known to me to be the person . 
executed the same. 
WITNESS my hand and official seal. 
(Seal) 
Signature. 
. subscribed to the within mstrument and acknowledged that 
^•"•^"^•^•^alfaaatoaalaaatualkuJl* 
Name {Typed or Primed) 
JQNNCfVSCI 
OOmtOM417 
NoawyPtiHorailoma 
MARIN COUNTY 
* * ^ ^ ^ ^ * a a a a j a ^ p B q a n q a . 
j oqo 
?«TE OF UTAH 
BOUNTY OF UTAH 
, ^ANOALLIJ?^ ' 19~ 
. ^
A a
^ ° ^ T o ^ E C Q g 0 E R 
»IM 
'OFFICE-
OEPUTV 
When Recorded Return to: 
Parsons Behle & Latimer 
Attention: Elizabeth S. Whitney, Esq. 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Send tax notices to: 
James T. Jensen 
190 North Carbon Avenue 
Price, Utah 84501 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
EVELYN P. BOYCE, of 1200 Charleton Avenue, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake 
County, Utah, GRANTOR, hereby QUIT-CLAIMS to JAMES T. JENSEN, of 190 North 
Carbon Avenue, Price, Carbon County, Utah 84501, JERRY J. JENSEN, of 190 North 
Carbon Avenue, Price, Carbon County, Utah 84501, DIX JENSEN, of 190 North Carbon 
Avenue, Price, Carbon County, Utah 84501, as tenants in common, GRANTEES, for the 
sum of ONE DOLLAR ($1) and for other good and valuable consideration, the following 
described real property in Utah County, State of Utah: 
Amis No. 1 Placer, a patented mining claim being Patent 
Mineral Survey No. 4224 (17.466 acres). 
Being part of Sections 35 and 36, Torn Range 9 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
WITNESS THE HAND of said Grantor t h i s ^ day of November, 1993. 
GRANTOR: 
EVELWP. BOYCE jT~ 
H T 7 9 9 0 3 BK 3 2 9 0 PG 3 5 + 
NINA B REID UTAH CO RECORDER BY OB 
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RECORDED FOR PARSONS BEHLE & LATIHER 
000 32 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ENT79903 BK 3 2 9 0 PG 3 S 5 
. t ^ 
The foregoing QUIT-CLAIM DEED was acknowledged before me this S day 
of November, 1993, by Evelyn P. Boyce. 
Hk,\-t^\ fxAsurs, 
My Commission Expires: 
(a. *z\.r\\\ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: S«jt> Uu.{a^ Ceu *\ 
NOTARY PUn. 
HELEN T ' " v.. 
M toi a* Mr 
II t^iutMr in 
•frComr 
•TAT: . • .AN 
1 
000 31 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
I, THE UNDERSIGNED RECORDER OF UTAH COUNTY, UTAH 
DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE ANNEXED AND FOREGOING IS A 
TRUE COPv CF THE ORIGINAL RECORDED DOCUMENT IN THE 
OFFICIAL RECORD IN MY OFFICE AS THE SAME APPEARS IN 
BOO ZP^f? ' AT PAGE 
WITNESS MY/HAND AND SEAL OF SAID OFFICE THIS &~ ^ 
DA 
DEPUTY 
When Recorded Return to: 
Parsons Behle & Latimer 
Attention: Elizabeth S. Whitney, Esq. 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Send tax notices to: 
James T. Jensen 
190 North Carbon Avenue 
Price, Utah 84501 
ENT 7 9 9 0 4 BK 3 2 9 0 PG 35<S 
NINA B REID UTAH CO RECORDER BY rtB 
1993 NOV 5 3:52 PH FEE 13.00 
RECORDED FOR PARSONS BEHLE & LATIHER 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
JOLENE WOODLAND, of 4130 Spring Glen, West Valley City, Utah, 
attorney-in-fact for LOIS P. CONNELL, of 39 Sulgrave Lane, San Rafael, California, 
GRANTOR, hereby QUIT-CLAIMS to JAMES T. JENSEN, of 190 North Carbon Avenue, 
Price, Carbon County, Utah 84501, JERRY J. JENSEN, of 190 North Carbon Avenue, 
Price, Carbon County, Utah 84501, DIX JENSEN, of 190 North Carbon Avenue, Price, 
Carbon County, Utah 84501, as tenants in common, GRANTEES, for the sum of ONE 
DOLLAR ($1) and for other good and valuable consideration, the following described real 
property in Utah County, State of Utah: 
Amis No. 1 Placer, a patented mining claim being Patent 
Mineral Survey No. 4224 (17.466 acres). 
Being part of Sections 35 and 36, Township 11 South, Range 9 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
WITNESS THE HAND of said Grantor this $ _ day of November, 1993. 
GRANTOR: 
LOIS P. CONNELL 
By: [.fj& &/lmJJU^r 
JOLENE WOODLAND, Attorney-in-fact 
• lo i 
Lois P. Connell 
000 30 
STATE OF UTAH ) ENT79904 BK 3 2 9 0 P5 3 5 7 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Jolene Woodland, wose identity was known or proven to me, appeared 
before me on the y A * day of November, 1993, and acknowledged to me that she is 
the attorney-in-fact for Lois P. Connell pursuant to a Power of Attorney dated the t& 1 
day of to^y~ l?g| and^  executed the above Quit-Claim Deed with 
authority duh/given. ^ 
lommission Expires: «.£•——• 
^,. /iff r""^>T"""'lir7Sffii » 
000 29 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
I, THE UNDERSIGNED RECORDER OF UTAH COUNTY, UTAH 
DO HERESY CERTIFY THAT THE ANNEXED AND FOREQOtKiG IS A 
TftUE COPY Of THE ORIGINAL RECORDED DOCUMENT IN THE 
O-PiCiAL RECORD IN MY OFFICE AS THE SAME APPEALS IN 
ECOK 3Pf[> ' AT PAGE S$~(P^^T7 
wn>i£SS W HAND AND SEAL OF SAID OFFICE THIS S ' T ' A . 
DAY OF j&MQH 19 °l^ 
DEPUTY 
